Decision Making & Negotiations

This chapter helps strategy scholars evaluate when, why, and how to employ historical research methods in strategy research.

Whether done intentionally or out of habit, many behaviors are repeated. Prior research has demonstrated that past behavior is an excellent predictor of future behavior in contexts as varied as media use, eating and drinking, substance abuse, voting, and travel mode choice, just to name a few. Although no one denies the evidence regarding the prevalence of repeat behavior and the predictive power of past behavior, two issues remain intensely debated

We consider three "crisis shocks" related to key features of the 2007-2008 crisis, for emerging and developed economies: (1) the collapse of global trade, (2) the contraction of credit supply, and (3) selling pressure on firms' equity. Using an international cross-section of firms, we find that returns' sensitivities to these shocks imply large and statistically significant influences on residual equity returns during the crisis period (after controlling for normal risk factors that are associated with expected returns).

This paper argues that there is a Coasean Bargain available to banks, Long-term Investors, and Bank Regulators around a particular form of "Contingent Capital." By purchasing rights to issue equity in crisis events at a pre-specified price from Long-term Investors, banks can ensure that they will have sufficient regulatory capital available when they need it most: in a crisis. By selling these rights (effectively, a form of crisis insurance) long-term investors can monetize their counter-cyclical investments strategies in banks and, thus, obtain an adequate return as long-term investors.

We consider a general class of network revenue management problems, where mean demand at each point in time is determined by a vector of prices, and the objective is to dynamically adjust these prices so as to maximize expected revenues over a finite sales horizon. A salient feature of our problem is that the decision maker can only observe realized demand over time, but does not know the underlying demand function which maps prices into instantaneous demand rate.

In social dilemmas, negotiations, and other forms of strategic interaction, mind-reading — intuiting another party's preferences and intentions — has an important impact on an actor's own behavior. In this paper, we present a model of how perceivers shift between social projection (using one's own mental states to intuit a counterpart's mental states) and stereotyping (using general assumptions about a group to intuit a counterpart's mental states).

This chapter on mind perception reviews social cognitive research on how individual perceivers draw inferences about the beliefs, desires, intentions, and feelings of others around them, a process that is at once remarkable and nearly ubiquitous. We begin by examining how perceivers do this, discussing research on various inferential sources, including reading situations, faces, behavior, social groups, and the self. We also discuss accounts that address how perceivers might shift between these inferential sources, such as embracing stereotyping in lieu of social projection or vice versa.

We present a novel linear program for the approximation of the dynamic programming cost-to-go function in high- dimensional stochastic control problems. LP approaches to approximate DP have typically relied on a natural “projection” of a well-studied linear program for exact dynamic programming. Such programs restrict attention to approximations that are lower bounds to the optimal cost-to-go function.

"Much of what we experience in life results from a combination of skill and luck." — From the Introduction

The trick, of course, is figuring out just how many of our successes (and failures) can be attributed to each — and how we can learn to tell the difference ahead of time.