Real Estate

We study the structure of optimal wedges and capital taxes in a dynamic Mirrlees economy with endogenous distribution of skills. Human capital is a private, stochastic state variable that drives the skill process of each individual. Building on the findings of the labor literature, we construct a tractable life-cycle model of human capital evolution with risky investment and stochastic depreciation.

Urban success increasingly has taken two different forms in the post-war era. One involves very high house price growth with relatively little population growth. The other pairs strong population expansion with mild house price appreciation. We document the heterogeneity across MSAs in the long-run house price growth rate and show that house price growth and housing unit growth tend to be inversely related. Income growth, too, varies widely across MSAs and high house price growth markets experience both high income growth and a right-shift of their entire income distribution.

I examine the impact of a property tax relief program in New York State that lowered the marginal cost of school expenditure to homeowners. I find that a typical school district, which received 20% of its revenue through the program in the school year 2001–2002, raised expenditure by 4.1% and local property taxes by 6.8% in response to the program. I then examine how the preferences of various groups of local taxpayers affect educational spending by identifying systematic variation across districts in the response to fiscal incentives.

Over the last two years, the housing market has turned sharply in many parts of the country. House prices have swung from steady rates of appreciation to outright declines, while sales and construction of new homes have dropped steeply. Much of this turmoil appears related to the boom and bust in mortgage markets over the last five years. It was not supposed to work out this way.

The global economic crisis in September 2008 was preceded by the crises of 2007: the subprime mortgage crisis, the corporate credit crunch, and the "quant liquidity crunch." The evolution of these crises appears to have resulted from a set of "deleveraging" that started in the subprime mortgage market but then spilled over into a number of other asset markets and resulted in large premiums in multiple markets. To respond to these events, new proprietary factors have been deployed that are not vulnerable to the actions of others.

The first hints of trouble in the mortgage market surfaced in mid-2005, and conditions subsequently began to deteriorate rapidly. Mortgage defaults and delinquencies are particularly concentrated among borrowers whose mortgages are classified as "subprime" or "near-prime." The main factors underlying the rise in mortgage defaults appear to be declines in house prices and deteriorated underwriting standards, in particular an increase in loan-to-value ratios and in the share of mortgages with little or no documentation of income.

This paper argues that the U.S. mortgage debacle must be analyzed in the broader setting of global real estate markets. Recent U.S. home price growth closely tracked increases in other developed economies. The analysis distinguishes among market regions in terms of supply elasticity and localized transactions-costs. A series of user-cost models are presented which imply that interest rate fluctuations must figure prominently in any explanation of movements in price/rent ratios. National factors such as the expansion of subprime credit must also be accounted for.

The subprime lending boom increased the ability of many Americans to get credit to purchase a house. Yet concerns persist that not all borrowers have been treated equally. Previous research suggests that subprime loans were particularly concentrated in neighborhoods with a high concentration of black and Hispanic residents (Mayer and Pence 2007).